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This paper presents some preliminary results of our re-
search project investigating the largest French firms and 
their directors, from the 1840s to the 2000s (the empirical 
research design is presented in Part III, below). This topic 
had of course already given birth to dozens of fine mono-
graphs and biographies. There was still however a lack of a 
strong synthesis that would integrate insights from eco-
nomic history and economic sociology, as well as from 
studies on the careers of elite actors and the governance of 
firms. Prior to our study, no effort had been made to sys-
tematically document the very list of the largest firms, with 
their main characteristics, for even a few landmark dates in 
the history of capitalism, let alone to list the directors of 
these firms and to investigate their lives. As a result, gen-
eral ideas about French capitalism are still mostly based on 
monographs – or, at worst, on preconceptions about the 
French political culture. We argue that a more systematic, 
quantified description of large firms and their directors is 
necessary to question such preconceptions and to better 
define the enduring idiosyncrasies – if they exist at all – of 
French capitalism. This is not a purely descriptive task that 
would only hold interest for navel-gazing French scholars. 
On the contrary, we argue that the French case has long 
held a significant rhetorical role in social sciences as the 
unquestioned epitome of State capitalism (and of “strong 
State” generally), whether it is discussed as an interesting 
variant among others or as a strange vestige of things past. 
Such an embodiment of a type, or even an ideal-type, by 
one empirical case, holds significant risks when it is used 
for not only illustrative purposes, but also time and again, 
and often implicitly, in presentations of theories. Too often 
it becomes a shortcut to avoid a rigorous specification of 
the type under discussion: the characteristics of “State 
capitalism” have for some time been more or less equated 
to “things the French do” (or are believed to do). The 
inclination of French capitalism toward “statism”, or dirig-
isme, is often presented as inevitable because of its [sup-
posedly?] extremely long roots, dating back to the Old 
Regime. Many (e.g. Guéry, 1989) cite 17th-century minis-
ter Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who created, among other de-
vices intended to promote French exports, privileged man-
ufacturers and official standards on the quality of privately 
produced cloth, along with public officers to enforce them. 
Others focus on the French revolution and Napoleonic 
reforms that generally forbade private collective regulations 
(e.g. by guilds) and gave rhetorical prominence to civil 
servants trained in specific schools and thereby supposed 
to know better about the general interest than entrepre-
neurs (e.g. Chadeau, 2000, p. 191-192). The socialist (and 
other) governments that raised public spending, created 
public monopolies, or monitored a wide range of prices 
from the 1930s on thus become the somewhat unex-
pected heirs of absolutism or Bonapartism. Some authors 
even believe French statism to be so strong as to continue 
to function even at the time of spectacular neo-liberal 
reforms, such as in 1986-1988 (Bellini, 2000, p. 33-34). 
Stretched to this point, the concept loses almost all of its 
value: some sort of State action, direct or indirect, is always 
to be found in economic policy, and this is not specific to 
France. If “State capitalism” covers Colbertian and Napo-
leonic as well as, for example, 1981 socialist policies, it will 
have little descriptive, let alone explanatory, power. But are 
there descriptions of State-led regulation of firms that 
were built independently of some assumption about the 
French economy? In Part I of this paper, we will argue that 
we lack such studies, because the literature on varieties of 
capitalism particularly has shown less and less interest in 
the “State capitalism” variant over the last decades. On 
the contrary, we believe that this variant is still empirically 
important, but that it requires a better definition. We will 
certainly not offer here a full-fledged version of such a 
definition, offering rather a modest but rigorous way to 
build it. It relies on systematic, quantifiable data, but takes 
seriously historical changes and the range of possible roles 
and positions of the State, instead of using a weak State 
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versus strong State dichotomy (on more general problems 
with this binomy, see e.g. Baldwin, 2005). 
In this preliminary paper, we will concentrate on a feature 
of State involvement in capitalism that has arguably been 
the object of the most heated debates and which is very 
strongly associated with France: the weight of State-
owned enterprises (SOEs). For example, Schmidt (2003, p. 
529) stated that “State-capitalist France’s dirigiste or inter-
ventionist state, by contrast, sought to direct economic 
activities through planning, industrial policy and state-
owned enterprises, in addition to all the ways the other 
states promoted business” and Chadeau (2000, p. 180) 
described France as a “homeland for the public sector”, 
with a majority of energy production, telecommunications, 
aircraft manufacturing, insurance and banking being man-
aged by the State in the early 1980s. Since it involves the 
State taking the place, and sometimes literally taking the 
property, of private capitalists, and was indeed considered 
by some political parties as a first step toward socialism, 
the creation of SOEs often bears the connotation of the 
State acting against the “normal” development of capital-
ism, replacing capitalists in a very active, direct way. There 
were however many different reasons for the establish-
ment of SOEs, which were even sometimes demanded by 
business associations. An empirical analysis not only of the 
number and size of SOEs, but also of their relationships 
with private firms is required before we consider their mere 
existence as a proxy for a strong State. Such an empirical 
analysis, especially if it is longitudinal, is useful in order to 
escape simplistic characterizations of national capitalism. 
Neither the number and size of SOEs, nor their relation-
ships with private firms remained unchanged, in any coun-
try, during the 20th century. In fact, in Part II of this paper, 
we will use already published material to point out the 
common rhythms found in many countries in the creation 
and privatization of SOEs. Their presence is certainly not a 
French peculiarity; it is specific to a period of time, not to a 
country or group of countries. 
We do not however argue that national trajectories should 
be disregarded in a study of State involvement in capital-
ism generally, or of the roles of SOEs specifically. We rather 
offer a replicable empirical strategy that can be used to 
produce better international comparisons. We demonstrate 
it in Part III by concentrating on the position occupied by 
SOEs in the French network of interlocking directorates, 
i.e. the ties created between firms by the fact that they 
share one or more board members. On the one hand, we 
find that SOEs have always been quite integrated in this 
network, contrary to what happened in other countries, 
such as Italy from the 1970s onwards. This is an interesting 
thread to follow in order to better understand the role 
played by the State, through SOEs, in capitalism. On the 
other hand, we find that the integration of the SOEs did 
not change the main, remarkably stable features of the 
French network of interlocking directorates. What appears 
to be an enduring French peculiarity, worth investigating 
further, is the particular shape of this network, which 
seems to denote a “status capitalism” rather than a State 
capitalism. 
Building on these initial insights, Part IV briefly discusses 
complementary ways to characterize other dimensions of 
the role of the State in capitalism. We plan to use to them 
illuminate the French case, and we hope that they will be 
used to build other useful comparative typologies.  
I. French Capitalism as an Epitome of 
State Capitalism? 
The debates about the historical trajectories of contempo-
rary capitalisms have been organized around two main 
questions. The first one has to do with the diversity versus 
convergence issue: do these trajectories converge toward a 
neo-liberal, market- and finance-centered, Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism (Orléan, 1999) – in which case the 
study of the French trajectory would be of little general 
interest – or are they organized around enduring, hetero-
geneous paths of development (Hall and Soskice, 2001a)? 
If such heterogeneous paths are found, it opens a second 
question: how should we make sense of it? Around which 
criteria should we build typologies of capitalism? The de-
gree to which these typologies do or do not consider the 
weight, role and tools of the State as a particularly relevant 
dimension seems to us to be one of the main substantive 
divisions between them (see for example Streeck, 2012). 
Until the late 1970s, the types of State intervention were 
one of the main criteria used to organize the diversity of 
capitalism, along with business practices and and industrial 
relations (Shonfield, 1965; Katzenstein, 1978; Schmidt, 
1996, 2003 usefully summed up these conceptions; see 
especially Table 1, reproduced below). These criteria were 
used to describe three ideal-types, each of which was as-
sociated with a few countries: market capitalism (United 
Kingdom and the United States), managed capitalism 
(Germany and smaller European countries such as the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden), and State capitalism 
(France and Italy). In fact, the role of the State was every-
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where in the definition of the last type, where the State 
was supposed to lead, control and/or mediate business and 
industrial relations, as well as to play a more general stra-
tegic (defining priorities) or organizing role and to directly 
invest in firms. Conversely, the description of the two other 
ideal-types was organized around the characterization of 
inter-firm and management-labor relations as either com-
petitive or co-operative; the State is assumed to be mostly 
absent (a passive bystander) in these two types of capital-
ism, or could have an enabling and perhaps mediating 
role. As Hall and Soskice put it, “countries were often 
categorized, according to the structure of their state, into 
those with “strong” and “weak” states” (Hall and Soskice, 
2001b, p. 2). 
See Appendix, Table 1: Characteristics of the post-
war varieties of capitalism (1950s-1970s) 
This key role of the State in older typologies contrasts with 
its apparent erasure from the conceptual apparatus of the 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach. On the contrary, 
this approach directly translated the difference between 
market capitalism and managed capitalism into an opposi-
tion between liberal market economies, where “firms co-
ordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and com-
petitive market arrangements”, and coordinated market 
economies, where “firms depend more heavily on non-
market relationships to coordinate their endeavors with 
other actors and to construct their core competencies” 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001b, p. 8). 
This choice to reinterpret part of the older typologies, but 
with the State pushed back into the shadows, is consistent 
with an approach aiming at putting the firm at the very 
center of the characterization of contemporary capitalisms. 
It is not uncontroversial, however, as this erasure of the 
State does not seemed to be based on an explicit assess-
ment of its lack of relevance for the typology. Howell 
(2003, p. 110), for example, states that “the theoretical 
framework of Varieties of Capitalism offers an extremely 
thin notion of politics and state action, in which govern-
ments, whose function is essentially to encourage coordi-
nation among economic actors, act largely at the behest of 
employers. States do not appear to have interests distin-
guishable from those of employers, nor do they have the 
capacity to act independently of, still less against, employer 
interests. Managing the political economy is a fundamen-
tally cooperative venture: coordinating activities, facilitating 
information flows, and encouraging cooperation.” The 
VoC literature mostly does not see the State because it 
presupposes that it has no specific role or interest. 
Have State capitalisms actually morphed into market or 
managed capitalisms? Schmidt points out that the role of 
the State, even in France and Italy, has certainly become 
different from what it was when the older typologies had 
been invented, due to the liberalization of the financial 
markets, privatization and deregulation. It is therefore 
probably more accurate to talk about a “state-enhanced” 
rather (with a “less direct influence” of the State) than a 
“State-led” capitalism (Schmidt, 2003, p. 527). Yet this 
should not lead to the conclusion that the State does not 
play any role at all anymore, or that this role is the same in 
all countries, without consequences for the varieties of 
capitalism. Schmidt also points out that simply viewing 
France, Italy, Korea or Taiwan as latecomers on the road to 
“Anglo-Saxon financial capitalism” or less successful “co-
ordinated capitalisms” (authors inspired by the VoC ap-
proach differ on this diagnostic) leaves behind a large 
number of important economies, possibly still character-
ized by a specific role of the State. 
In our own research, we take the notion of “state-
enhanced capitalism” as a vague but useful point of depar-
ture. More importantly, we consider that such debates 
should lead us to better define relevant dimensions of the 
role of the State (that include various actors and tools 
across various spheres), instead of keeping one simple 
scale from weak to strong State, or from bystander to 
investor/director. Rather than just advocacy for more com-
plex indicators, this specification is a way to better assess 
differences, both between countries and between periods. 
It implies that we actually define criteria and find data 
about them before classifying countries, then deriving 
ideal-types from them. The various roles listed in Table 1 
above, despite the dominance of the weak-strong dichot-
omy in it, can be used as inspiration, as they include e.g. 
arbitrator or facilitator; but they need to be translated into 
something that can actually be observed in empirical data, 
preferably in a systematic and comparative way, on the 
basis of primary evidence. 
In the following sections of this paper, we will try to 
demonstrate the promises of this approach by focusing on 
SOEs, which are nowadays generally considered as one of 
the doomed features of a strong State. We will show that 
using their mere number or weight as a criterion of State 
capitalism (focusing on the State as shareholder or owner 
of firms) leads to the association of State capitalism with a 
State or Status Capitalism? 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
20 
period, or periods (which differ in terms of the exact roles 
for the State) rather than with a country such as France or 
a set of countries (Part II). This does not mean, however, 
that the position of SOEs among firms lacks any relevance 
as a criterion for national types of capitalisms. We need 
more comparative research, however, to characterize varie-
ties in terms of this role, as we will show in Part III. 
II. The Weight of State-Owned 
Enterprises: A Feature of a Time, not of 
a Country 
If we want to take the number or weight of SOEs as a 
criterion in a typology of capitalism, we consider that a 
systematic comparison is more appropriate than a focus on 
individual cases, however striking, such as the fact that the 
French State owned car manufacturer Renault from 1945 
to 1996. We rely here on a synthesis of recent books and 
papers devoted to the growth and decline of SOEs in 
Western countries, and especially on the contributions 
gathered in Toninelli (2000). We read them, sometimes 
against the grain, following insights developed by Mar-
gairaz (1996), Bon et al. (2004), and Millward (2005). This 
allows us to make a general point: when considered in a 
systematic comparative perspective, France appears to have 
been in the middle of the road, rather than as an extreme 
case or as an exception. The more striking differences 
appear between periods, not between European countries. 
These periods were roughly delimited by the world wars 
and the economic crises, which allowed new questions to 
be defined as public problems (e.g. the lack of credit for 
small businesses, the difficulty of providing some sort of 
energy, the crises in entire industrial sectors) and left the 
owners of existing firms or opponents to nationalization 
with less strength to resist the creation of SOEs. While on 
other matters or at other times, national political cultures 
led to different answers to similarly defined new problems 
(Dobbin, 1994), in this case international isomorphism 
seems to have been stronger. Considered in a long-run 
perspective, the presence of the SOEs in France, as else-
where, concerns first and foremost a forty-year period 
after World War II: it barely looks like a defining national 
feature. However, France arguably followed a specific path 
during the demise of the SOEs, from the 1980s on. 
It is often thought that the first rise of SOEs took place just 
after the World War I. What actually changed at that time, 
however, was mostly rhetoric, which expressed an increas-
ing demand for “public services”, especially in transporta-
tion and energy related to the ideal of “general interest” 
(Margairaz, 1996, p. 32). Public services, however, did not 
necessarily involve State property: they had existed without 
it, in the form of concessions, in 19th-century France as in 
other countries, including the United States. Despite of the 
increased involvement of the State in the economy during 
the total war, most of the French were not ready in 1919 
to go on with public controls and consortia, even if regula-
tions increased in some sectors, such as energy. The minis-
ter of Industrial reconstruction Louis Loucheur announced 
that it was time to “return industry to normal competi-
tion” (ibid.; see also Kuisel, 1984). Proposals to nationalize 
the railways were rejected, as they had been during the 
19th century. A few SOEs were created in the late 1910s 
and early 1920s; although these can be seen as important 
pioneers in retrospect, they were not offered much capital 
(as in the case of Crédit national, created in 1919 to fi-
nance small businesses) and often had to compete, with 
little success, with private competitors. For example, the 
Office National Interprofessionnel de l’Azote, created to 
deal with specific issues due raised by the reunification of 
Alsace-Lorraine with France, competed unsuccessfully 
against Saint-Gobain (ironically a former privileged manu-
facture created by Colbert, a quite successful private 
French firms in the 20th century, briefly nationalized in 
1982-86). A similar story happened in the United King-
dom, with an arguably earlier nationalization of the Cen-
tral Electricity Boad in 1926. In the 1920s, Germany was in 
fact the exception as regards SOEs: even before the Nazi 
regime, both the Reich and Länder became involved in 
industrial production in all sectors as well as in public utili-
ties, employing more than a million workers in 1925 (We-
genroth, 2000). 
The economic crisis in the 1930s removed political and 
symbolic hindrances to State intervention in most coun-
tries, even those that remained democracies. In France, 
railways finally became a State monopoly in 1937. Far from 
being the whim of a socialist government (Margairaz, 
1996, p. 38 even describes “a nationalisation alien to Pop-
ular Front ideology”), this decision was negotiated over 
several years, with some of the private company owners 
eager to be bought out by the State, as the private system 
had become unprofitable. In any case, France was not 
really an exception; the London Passenger Transport Board 
was created in 1933, and airlines became partly State-
controlled in both countries. The fascist and Nazi States 
were of course even more radical, especially as regards the 
financial system, which remained relatively untouched in 
democracies (the French National Bank, for example, was 
still private, although its nationalization had been decided). 
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In Italy, IRI was created in 1933 to release the three leading 
Italian banks from their excessive industrial holdings (up to 
42 percent of the overall capital of Italian corporations). By 
the end of the war, the Nazi State controlled half of all 
German stock, according to Wegenroth (2000). 
As for democracies and apart from Weimar Germany, the 
growth of SOEs exploded for the most part at the end of 
WWII – again, not more in France than elsewhere. Within a 
few years, the French and British State took over their 
respective National Banks, coal mines and gas and electrici-
ty industries; the British railway system, waterways and civil 
airlines became SOEs, along with four of the biggest 
French bank networks and most insurance companies 
(Chadeau, 2000, Millward, 2005). Some sectors that es-
caped the nationalization program in France at that time, 
such as iron and steel, did not in the UK. In Italy, the rise of 
the public sector was even more important (Amatori, 
2000; Toninelli and Vasta, 2010). SOEs also took a new 
and large place in smaller European countries such as Bel-
gium, the Netherlands (Davids and van Zanden, 2000) and 
Austria (Stiefel, 2000), and, outside Europe, in Canada and 
Australia. Even in the quite different case of Taiwan, with 
Japanese occupation followed by a party-State, we find 
nationalizations occurring just after WWII and privatiza-
tions beginning in the 1990s (Lee and Velema, 2014). In 
fact, Germany was still the exception, this time with a first 
(controversial) wave of privatizations as early as the late 
1950s; but this wave was hardly complete, as SOEs contin-
ued to be reorganized and diversified at least until the 
1960s (Wegenroth, 2000). 
However, France arguably followed a specific path during 
the demise of the SOEs, from the 1980s on. While Marga-
ret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, from 1979 on, and 
Ronald Reagan in the USA, from 1980 on, implemented 
neo-liberal reforms including, in the UK, a radical program 
of privatization, the socialists who won the French elec-
tions of 1981 launched a spectacular program of nationali-
zation. Focused on finance and industry, it unfolded at the 
same scale as in 1945 in terms of number of firms, alt-
hough it did not create new public monopolies (Chabanas 
& Vergeau, 1996). At first sight, the French chronology 
only seems close to that of Portugal: there, nationalizations 
only began in 1975, when democracy was established, 
they had a perimeter similar to that found in France, and 
privatizations followed after 1989 (Ferreira da Silva and 
Neves 2014). 
Yet the contrast that seems obvious requires a few qualifi-
cations. First, nationalizations of firms struggling with a 
new and more challenging economic atmosphere had 
occurred in in the UK and in Italy as late as in the 1970s, 
while nothing of the sort was to be found in France during 
this decade: the difference was in chronology more than in 
scale or types of firms controlled. Second, in the UK, no 
really large SOEs were privatized before 1984 (British Tele-
com), and most of the privatization wave took place in the 
early 1990s (Millward, 2005). Since by this time the right 
had come back to power in France and had also decided to 
privatize, the empirical chronology, if not that of discourse, 
was in fact quite similar in the two countries. The main 
difference, and indeed the French exceptionalism, was that 
dozens of previously private French firms had lived through 
a spell of public ownership in the 1980s. If we consider the 
whole 20th century and only focus on the number and size 
or SOEs, this interim could seem negligible: the French and 
British trajectories look quite similar to each other, espe-
cially as compared to Germany (with early public owner-
ship, then early privatization) or Italy (where no privatiza-
tions occurred in the aftermath of the economic crises). On 
the contrary, the Italian State bought the minority partici-
pations of private shareholders in the most threatened 
SOEs, then recapitalized them, leading to a sharper divide 
between public and private ownership (Toninelli and Vasta, 
2010). 
When not directly framed as an exception, but considered 
in a more comparative perspective and over the long run, 
the French trajectory in terms of SOEs thus appears close 
to the British one, and more generally to the European 
mainstream. At this very macro level, the role of the State 
as investor or director of the economy, channeled through 
SOEs, does not seem much stronger there than elsewhere. 
Differences in this regard, in fact, are generally less nation-
al than longitudinal. However, small differences between 
countries in terms of chronology, sectors or share of own-
ership might in fact reflect a quite different role for SOEs in 
national capitalisms. As we have seen, SOEs were created 
for diverse reasons. Discussing the French case, Margairaz 
(1996) points out that their creation was often a mere 
change of tool used to continue essentially the same eco-
nomic policy. Depending on whether SOEs also have pri-
vate shareholders or not, whether they are public monopo-
lies or compete with national or foreign firms, whether 
their employees enjoy a status similar to that of civil serv-
ants or not, and whether they were thriving or in crisis 
before becoming State-owned, the role that they enable 
the State to play can vary widely, possibly across the whole 
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range of roles listed in Table 1 above. In this respect, na-
tional differences might reappear, although differences 
between periods are still likely to dominate. Our dataset on 
interlocking directorate does not allow us to directly de-
scribe these roles, but it enables us to better describe the 
position of SOEs among private firms. 
III. SOEs in the French Intercorporate 
Networks: State or Status Capitalism? 
As we have noted earlier, the VoC approach organizes the 
heterogeneity of capitalisms by contrasting the liberal mar-
ket economies and the coordinated market economies, 
leaving barely any room for the State in the analysis of 
contemporary capitalisms. When the State appears to play 
a role, it does so by facilitating the relationships between 
actors in coordinated market economy (see for example 
Hall and Soskice, 2001b, p. 35). The role of the State in the 
coordination process is either direct, through the use of 
dedicated tools such as planning, or more implicit, with the 
intermingling of business and administrative elites. Focus-
ing on SOEs offers a way to better define this coordinating 
role of the State among large firms, in order to empirically 
test this second order and somewhat vague hypothesis of 
the VoC approach. This empirically-grounded discussion 
takes the State more seriously as a potentially autonomous 
actor, with specific interests and the resources to defend 
them. 
SOEs in the big business community: an interlocking 
directorates approach 
When SOEs exist, they are an integral part in networks of 
inter-firm relationships. Depending on political choices and 
on the reactions of private firms, their position could be 
that of outsiders, more or less isolated in a cluster of SOEs 
cut from the remainder of the business community and the 
capitalist economy, or that of insiders, more or less central 
and even potentially in a position to influence private firms, 
especially those in the same economic sector. We will not 
address here their place in networks of ownership or ex-
change of goods and services, but we will discuss their 
position in another specific type of relationship: interlock-
ing directorates. 
When an individual sits on two corporate board concur-
rently, as an external director and/or a top executive, he or 
she is said to hold interlocking directorships with the two 
companies, tying them together at the level of governance. 
The study of interlocking directorates, which began in the 
US in the early 20th century as part of antitrust campaigns, 
has been the basis of hundreds of papers, due to the rela-
tive availability of data (Carroll and Sapinski, 2011). The 
fact that individuals simultaneously hold positions in sever-
al boards can be considered either as a tie between the 
individuals, leading to an analysis of solidarity among the 
economic elite (Useem, 1984) or as a tie between the 
firms. It is this second view that we will consider here: we 
are interested in the positions of SOEs among private firms, 
in terms of the former sharing or not sharing their directors 
with the latter. Interlocks viewed as ties between firms 
have traditionally been considered as an indicator of the 
power structure in the big business community (Mintz and 
Schwartz, 1985). Most studies of interlocks have dealt with 
the US case and especially with the largest firms as listed 
by Fortune, so the position of SOEs was not considered 
relevant. Ties between the State and capitalism were most-
ly viewed through the very specific lens of political contri-
butions, with questions centered on the political unity, or 
lack thereof, of the business community and on the diffu-
sion of political preferences among firms (Mizruchi, 1992; 
Bond and Harrigan, 2011). In this case, the political admin-
istration was possibly an outcome of, among other things, 
the structure of the network of interlocking directorates; 
but the State was nowhere to be seen in the network 
itself. On the contrary, in Europe, the number and weight 
of SOEs makes their position interesting, especially as the 
choice of their board members is one of the things that the 
State generally controls. Does it choose the same individu-
als as private firms, thus creating ties between SOEs and 
these firms or do the boards of SOEs constitute a world 
apart, isolating their directors from the rest of the econom-
ic elite and consolidating exceptional practices? 
Interlocking directorates certainly do not reflect all the 
relationships that take place between firms, although they 
are often used as a proxy in this way, including in VoC 
approaches. In this case, the relative lack of interlocks is 
considered typical of liberal market economies, such as 
that of the UK, and a wealth of interlocks appears in coor-
dinated market economies, for example in Germany. 
Countries generally characterized as having a strong State, 
such as Italy and France, fall somewhere in between the 
UK and Germany in terms of the overall density of inter-
locks (Stokman et al., 1985; Windolf, 2002). The de-
densification of interlocks found in several economies in 
the beginning of the 21st century, for example in Switzer-
land (Bühlmann et al., 2012), could then be interpreted as 
convergence toward the liberal model as well as the prod-
uct of globalization disrupting national networks. Density 
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alone, however, does not describe the shape of inter-firm 
relationships, which may be clustered or integrated, and 
hierarchical or egalitarian. It is in this general structure and 
in the specific position of SOEs that we are interested. In 
terms of interlocks, are SOEs a world apart from the rest of 
capitalism, or are they integrated, and if so how? Do na-
tional peculiarities appear at this scale? 
Empirical research design 
This paper discusses a few of our first research results, with-
out giving all the relevant tables or graphs, although these 
can be provided on demand. More general results will be 
published shortly in François and Lemercier 2014. 
In order to build our dataset, we selected the 50 largest fi-
nancial and the 200 largest non-financial French firms listed 
at the Paris stock exchange during specific years: 1911, 1928, 
1937, 1956, 1979, 1990, 20001. We have used a consistent 
criterion of size, share capital, and a consistent source, the 
Annuaire Desfossés series, for all years. 
In fact, additional datasets, not used in this paper, were built 
on the same principles for 1840 (when financial directories 
appeared), 1857 and 1883. Still other datasets were centered 
on the 120 firms with the largest market capitalization for 
1857, 1883, 1911, 1937, 1956, 1979, and 2009; we then col-
lected biographies for one to three top executives in each firm 
and for all directors holding at least two seats in these da-
tasets. We are only beginning to analyze the biographical 
dataset. 
The number of firms and the sampled years in the datasets 
that we will use in this paper have been chosen in order to 
allow comparisons with other countries, this research being 
part of a comparative project led by Thomas David and 
Gerarda Westerhuis. In fact, work is still needed to ensure 
more robustness in international comparisons of interlock-
ing directorates networks, as it is difficult to build datasets 
based on the exact same criteria, especially as regards the 
definition of directors, which differs widely from country to 
country and very much influences the shape of the network. 
In fact, this definition also differs from period to period: even 
in our research on France, we had to take additional care to 
ensure longitudinal comparability in this respect. 
French financial directories, which aim at providing inves-
tors with information on firms, also list SOEs, generally as a 
separate category and in a prominent place (e.g. before list-
ing private firms), even when they are 100% state-owned 
and do not have shares or issue bonds. Therefore, we were 
able to include SOEs in our sample along with private firms, 
using the same size threshold – although some inconsisten-
cies between successive directories lead to a few changes in 
our list of SOEs. For dates prior to 1990, SOEs were recog-
nized as such thanks to the descriptions of firms included in 
the source, cross-referenced with published lists (Chaba-
nas/Vergeau 1996). For 1990 and 2000, the source included 
information on the ownership of stock. We considered firms 
to be State-owned when the first shareholder was the State 
and it held at least one-third of the shares. The fact that 
these firms were described in what was effectively a list of the 
largest French firms and a who's who of the business elite is 
in itself significant for our research. It also led us to compute 
indicators on their place in the network of interlocking direc-
torates. While most other teams in this comparative research 
did not do so, we believe that it would be interesting to devise 
such systematic comparisons in the future. 
The position of SOEs in the interlocking directorates 
network: insights for a comparison 
In order to answer these questions, we would need sys-
tematic international comparisons that should not be diffi-
cult to devise, as many datasets on interlocks now exist; 
however, it seems that their authors were not generally 
very interested in the State or SOEs, so we found few re-
sults that could be directly compared with ours. We will 
here focus on a comparison with Italy, which exemplifies 
two different patterns; along with additional evidence for 
four other, admittedly small countries, it will allow us to 
present hypotheses on the way we could make sense of 
the position of SOEs in interlocking directorates networks. 
In addition, a longitudinal comparison in the case of France 
shows a consistent positioning of SOEs, regardless of their 
number. Moreover, the creation of SOEs did not change 
the overall structure of French interlocks, which we found 
to be based on a hierarchy of status among firms. Far from 
disrupting pre-existing patterns of inter-firm relationships, 
the State seems to have adapted to them or even used 
them: SOEs played a role that they did not invent, but that 
they took on together with other firms. 
Let us first briefly describe the Italian case, in order to con-
trast it with the French trajectory. As reported by Rinaldi 
and Vasta (2005, 2012, 2014), the nationalizations of firms 
during the fascist period and after WWII gave birth, until 
the beginning of the 1960s, to a dense and hierarchical 
national network of interlocking directorates. The largest 
electrical companies, which were still private, were at the 
State or Status Capitalism? 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 15, Number 2 (March 2014) 
24 
core of this network. During this period, private firms and 
SOEs were strongly interconnected, sharing many direc-
tors. The nationalization of the electrical industry in 1962 
however dissolved the center of this network. A specific 
type of SOE creation, the establishment of a sector mo-
nopoly, thus had an important impact on the general 
structure of inter-firms relationships, at least in terms of 
shared board members. The network of private firms was 
rebuilt in the following decades, with a new core made of 
financial companies. At the same time, the share of public 
ownership of SOEs was augmented, leading to the disap-
pearance of some interlocks that had apparently been 
based on ownership ties (with seats on the board of a firm 
being held by representatives of firms partly owning it or 
owned by it). From the 1970s on, the Italian network of 
interlocking directorates exhibited a dual structure, with 
SOEs not only becoming marginal, but ultimately constitut-
ing a separate cluster. The Italian case shows that the mere 
number or economic weight of SOEs does not predict their 
position in terms of interlocking directorates; it reminds us 
that this position is likely to depend very much on their 
monopolistic character and on the existence of private 
shareholders. If State capitalism has existed in Italy 
throughout the 20th century, it has produced two very 
different patterns, first of strong integration, then of 
strong separation, between the boards of private firms and 
those of SOEs. 
On the contrary, France exhibits an enduring pattern of 
integration, despite the changing numbers and types of 
SOEs and the changing role assigned to them by different 
political administrations. Some of these changes have in 
fact had an effect on interlocking directorates, but what is 
especially striking in the French case is the consistency in 
the general structure of the network and the fact that 
SOEs seem to have always adapted to it. In order to pre-
sent both the enduring structure of the French network 
and the integrated and even central position of SOEs, we 
can focus on the graph for 1990. It shows that, apart from 
a small number of complete isolates, the largest French 
firms are all part of a dense and centralized network of 
interlocking directorates. This network has a distinct core 
and concentric peripheries; firms in the core have dense 
ties with each other as well as ties with firms in the periph-
eries, while the latter have fewer ties, both with each other 
and with the core. We will come back shortly to the specif-
ic characteristics of firms in the core as opposed to those in 
the periphery. What we first want to point out is the fact 
that SOEs are very integrated in this network, especially in 
contrast with Italy at the same period. None of them is 
isolated, and they are present in the core as well as and 
perhaps even more than in the peripheries. In addition, 
whereas a region at the top-right of the graph shows a 
higher density of interconnected white circles, SOEs also 
show many ties with private firms: they do not constitute a 
separate cluster. 
See Appendix, Graph 1: Interlocking directorates 
among the 252 largest French listed firms in 1990 
Quantitative indicators confirm the impressions derived 
from this graph. Moreover, even if 1990 can be considered 
a high point in the centrality and integration of SOEs, as 
well as in the density of the overall French network of 
interlocking directorates in the post-war period, a similar 
positioning of SOEs can be found in our datasets for 1956 
and 1979 (when there were around 20 very large SOEs 
described in our source, as in 1990) and even 2000 (when 
only seven remained). In 1956, 1990 and 2000, SOEs were 
related through interlocking directorates to a significantly 
larger number of firms than the average large firm in our 
dataset (in network terms, they had a significantly higher 
degree centrality, significance being assessed by random 
simulation). Their average number of ties was close to that 
of private financial firms (even higher in 2000), and fi-
nance, in France as elsewhere, is generally found at the 
core of interlocking directorates networks. Of course, the 
high centrality of SOEs can be partially related to the fact 
that many of these SOEs were themselves financial firms. 
State-owned banks, however, were not the only central 
SOEs: in 1956, it was also the case for the railway, gas, 
and electricity national monopolies; in 1990, many indus-
trial companies, including for example the automobile 
manufacturer Renault and petroleum group Elf-Aquitaine, 
were extremely central in the network. 
Our 1979 sample shows a different pattern, that allows us 
to stress another mechanism explaining the positions of 
SOEs in the network. This sample still exhibits very inte-
grated SOEs. At that time, roughly half of these firms were 
also part of the core of the network, and the State-owned 
bank Crédit Foncier de France, which shared board mem-
bers with 37 other firms, was among the five most central 
firms, along with four private banks. However, the other 
half of the SOEs, including the national electricity compa-
ny, appear at the periphery of our network. The same kind 
of contrast, although weaker, can be found for 1990 and 
2000, dates when we have data on shareholding. For 
these two samples, we can discriminate between those 
SOEs that were 100% State-owned and/or sector monopo-
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lies, which tended to be more peripheral in our network, 
and those in which the State owned a lower share and/or 
which competed directly with large private firms, which 
tended to be more central. Those SOEs that had ownership 
ties with private firms and/or competed with them also 
were integrated, and even central, in the interlocking di-
rectorate network. 
The same pattern can be found in many other countries. In 
the 1976 Austrian network, for example, SOEs generally 
were both very homophilic and extremely central (even 
hegemonic in the core) in the interlocking directorates 
network, but the postal and railway monopolies had few 
interlocks (Ziegler et al. 1985). In Portugal, in the early 
1980s, when the new SOEs were mostly 100% State-
owned monopolies, they did not interlock with private 
firms (or with each other), while in 2010, the remaining 
SOEs had ownership ties with private firms and were quite 
central in the interlocking directorates network (Ferreira da 
Silva and Neves, 2014 ; for the Taiwanese case, see Lee 
and Velma, 2014). The same is true in Italy, but with a 
reverse chronological order: as we have seen, once firms 
get nationalized to rescue them from the early 1970s on, 
they began to be cut from the rest of the network, while 
when they were conceived to be national champions, they 
were very central and homophilic. The important point, in 
the French case, is that even when SOEs were not central, 
they never formed a separate cluster. 
Looking at the characteristics of the firms French SOEs are 
linked to, it appears that SOEs have always exhibited a 
statistical preference for sharing directors with other large 
SOEs, rather than with large private firms – in network 
terms, their homophily was high and significant, as con-
firmed by simulations. The density of interlocking direc-
torates among SOEs (the percentage of theoretically possi-
ble ties that were actually present) was three to ten times 
higher than that of the full network. Yet, as shown on the 
1990 graph – and the situation was the same in our other 
samples – and contrary to what happened in Italy after 
1970, this did not create separate clusters of SOEs, be-
cause they had so many shared board members with other 
firms that quite a lot of them were also shared with private 
firms. This was especially true within economic sector 
(broadly defined, e.g. finance, energy, transportation and 
utilities, so that these ties were not only among competi-
tors). SOEs, like private firms and to an even greater ex-
tent, exhibited a statistical preference for sharing board 
members with firms in the same sector, even with different 
ownership. Finally, the cross-sector ties of SOEs, when not 
with other SOEs, show a statistical preference for the larg-
est private firms. What our results show is that, while 
French SOEs have often tended to share board members 
with other SOEs, neither these nor private firms have cho-
sen to avoid the other. The world of French boards has 
always been a very hierarchical and integrated one, and 
SOEs, since their creation, have been an integral part of it, 
generally in a prominent place. 
State or status capitalism? 
This prominent place SOEs occupy within the interlocking 
directorates network is nothing but a symptom of the way 
they came to embed themselves in a preexisting structure 
they did not disrupt in any major way. The main result of 
our general research on French interlocking directorates is 
indeed that the general structure of the network has re-
mained surprisingly stable since the beginning of the 20th 
century – and seemingly since the last third of the 19th 
century (François and Lemercier, 2014). This stable shape 
can be related to two distinct and complementary features 
of the network, produced by two different mechanisms. 
First, the network is very hierarchical, i.e. not only dense, 
but centered on a core surrounded by successive peripher-
ies. This hierarchical structure is produced by what we call 
a status mechanism, which we will describe below. Sec-
ondly, some smaller and denser sub-regions appear in the 
network. These denser clusters are produced by a group-
building mechanism. Our main result, as regards the SOEs, 
is that they did not disrupt either of these two mechanisms 
when they were created after World War II; on the contra-
ry, they conformed with these two dynamics, in which they 
were soon to play quite a prominent role. 
Let us first consider the group-building mechanism and the 
denser clusters it generates. Before World War II, as seen in 
our 1937 sample, the high density of the network came 
from the existence of very dense clusters where multiple 
board members shared between the same pairings of firms 
were used to create “groups” in the first half of the centu-
ry. These structures were especially prevalent in the electri-
cal industry: neither mergers nor cartels, they did not sys-
tematically rely on ownership ties, but they allowed fami-
lies or other small groups of people to control many differ-
ent large firms. Electricity firms indeed needed very large 
capital, but they flourished in the first decades of the 20th 
century, representing up to one fifth of our sample. The 
very names of these firms show how embedded they were 
in a local context of production and distribution: Electricité 
de Marseille, Forces motrices du Haut-Rhin, Société hydro-
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électrique des Basses-Pyrénées, etc. Yet they were loosely 
linked to each other in a handful of groups anchored in 
wider regions, so that the overall density of interlocking 
directorates in the electricity sector was two to three times 
higher than in the French network generally – even with-
out taking into account the multiplicity of shared board 
members in many pairings of firms. These firms held con-
cessions to produce and/or distribute electricity in specific 
regions or towns and, in the interwar period, were regu-
lated by the State to a greater and greater extent; the 
government had accepted the type of relationships created 
by multiple interlocks between these firms. The birth of 
Électricité de France in 1945 thus destroyed large numbers 
of interlocks as disbursed but highly cohesive firms were 
replaced by a national monopoly. Yet the new SOE re-
tained many employees and many of the organizational 
features of the bygone groups in its internal structure 
(Morsel, 1987; Vuillermot, 2000). The birth of some SOEs, 
namely the monopolies in transportation (railways), gas 
and electricity, actually disrupted the extremely dense inter-
locks that had existed among the many large and central 
firms in these sectors before World War II. In this respect, 
newly born SOEs had a strong effect on the general densi-
ty of the French network, which dropped between our 
1937 and 1956 samples. This impact, however, changed 
some superficial features of the network, rather than the 
underlying group-building mechanism: the new monopo-
lies were built directly from pieces that the pre-war net-
work had already put together. 
The bending of SOEs to conform with preexisting dynamics 
is even more obvious when it comes to the second mecha-
nism: the status logic that shaped the French network long 
before SOEs existed. This status mechanism is the cause of 
the hierarchical structure of the network: firms in its core, 
that are therefore both central and prone to share board 
members with each other, also share a stable set of attrib-
utes that we propose to consider as status indicators. The 
status score of a firm, in each of our samples, is extremely 
correlated with its central position in the network. This 
means that firms with a high status share board members 
with a high number of other firms (they are central in the 
network) and that a high percentage of the firms with 
which they are related also have a high status (they are 
homophilic). Firms on the periphery, on the contrary, have 
few ties with the center and even fewer among them-
selves. 
Our status indicators include a few stable characteristics: 
firms with a high status: are the largest (in the highest 
quartile of our sample in terms of share capital); have 
headquarters in Paris; are active in some specific sectors 
(finance in all of the samples, a few others for some sam-
ples, e.g. transportations and utilities in the first half of the 
century); and were already in our sample at the previous 
date (firms that are old enough and have been very large 
for long enough). On Graph 1, the size of circles is based 
on this very simple status indicator: from 0 to 4 for each 
firm, depending on the number of status criteria that are 
met. Graph 1 shows rather large white circles: SOEs tend-
ed to meet these enduring criteria of status, that were 
established long before their creation. This explains their 
central position in the network: they were chosen as po-
tential sources of shared board members for the same 
reasons as other large, Parisian, rather old and often finan-
cial firms. The status mechanisms that had been at play for 
more than a half-century when many SOEs were created 
after 1945 were not changed by their establishment: being 
owned by the State simply was a new feature that hap-
pened to often be shared by many central, high-status 
firms. 
The State through the lenses of SOEs: State capital-
ism reconsidered 
The fact that SOEs did not disrupt the French interlocking 
directorates network and its underlying mechanisms of 
status and group-building should lead us to reconsider the 
role of the State among large firms . This tendency to con-
form with pre-existing mechanisms can be interpreted as a 
sign that it was not so much the State that shaped inter-
corporate relationships in the post-war period, but rather 
big business that made State-related actors comply with its 
own logic. In the late 1960s, the roles and tasks of SOEs 
were redefined by the French government in a way that 
made this shaping of public actors by private logics quite 
obvious. The government became increasingly aware of 
international competition and commissioned several re-
ports on the reform of firms generally and SOEs specifical-
ly. A radical reform plan for SOEs was enacted in 1971; 
they had to decide on employment plans related to eco-
nomic forecasts, which led industrial SOEs to lose between 
a quarter and a third of their work force in the 1970s, and 
to turn to financial markets (Chadeau, 2000). This adop-
tion of private business logic within the SOEs is directly 
related to the role the State assigns to the firms that it 
owns. While in Italy, since the early 1970s at least, nation-
alization was implemented as a rescue device for lame 
ducks, SOEs were supposed to be national champions in 
France – and hence were expected to adopt business prac-
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tices that would make them highly competitive. This iso-
morphism between private and public practices (from the 
former to the latter) is coherent with the fact that French 
public and private firms have often shared parts of their 
boards: if they are to be run the same way, their managers 
and directors can be exchanged. 
Was then the nationalization program implemented in 
France in the early 1980s an anachronistic aberration, as 
stated by several scholars such as Chadeau (2000)? 
Shouldn’t the adoption of strategies similar to those of 
private firms lead to early privatizations? A different inter-
pretation is also possible, one that sees the nationalization-
privatization sequence of the 1980s as coherent with the 
two mechanisms that have shaped the French network of 
interlocking directorates during the whole 20th century. To 
correctly interpret the adoption of private practices in pub-
lic firms and the sharing of directors, one should keep in 
mind that this isomorphism was more a mean than an end 
in and of itself. The aim was to strengthen SOEs so that 
they would be able to face an increasingly strong interna-
tional competition. Adopting private sector logic was a 
way to achieve this goal. Firms that were nationalized in 
the early 1980s were believed to be extremely weakened 
by almost one decade of economic crisis, and the aim of 
their nationalization was to strengthen them. It was there-
fore not so different from the goal pursued by the adop-
tion of private sector logic within SOEs in the 1970s. In the 
following years, new SOEs were actually strengthened, 
especially on a financial ground, thanks to a massive public 
refunding and the balancing of their debt. Once these 
firms were privatized, between the mid-1980s and the late 
1990s, they were strong enough to successfully face inter-
national competition.  
The exact privatization process is also important for our 
purpose, as it relied on financial strategies directly related 
to the mechanisms of status and group-building. As Morin 
(1996) has clearly documented, privatizations relied on the 
building of “noyaux durs” (“hard kernels”) (also discussed 
by Maclean et al. (2006, 185-187), who, like us, emphasize 
the relative continuity of government policies in this re-
spect). The government and political administration, in a 
context of growing intermingling of financial markets, 
feared that the privatized firms could be taken over by 
foreign, and more specifically US, institutional investors. 
Had this happened, all the efforts by the French State to 
refund these firms would benefit only foreign financial 
actors. To avoid this, cross-shareholding was deliberately 
organized: firm A got privatized through the buying of a 
large share of its capital by firm B, which could also be 
privatized, with its capital bought by firm A. This hard 
kernel strategy is coherent with the two generating mech-
anisms of the French interlocking directorates network. 
This kind of cross-ownership is reminds us of the loose-
coupling dynamics that had led to the constitution of local-
ly dense clusters within the network, for example in the 
electrical industry, as ownership ties often were coupled 
with shared board members. In addition, hard kernels 
involved private firms along with the SOEs that were to 
become private, but the partners always already had a high 
status. Hard kernels increased their ties in ways that only 
strengthened the status mechanism in the overall interlock-
ing directorates network. This hard kernel strategy led to 
the network represented in Figure 1, where SOEs that 
were then in the process of privatization appeared in the 
central core of the network, even more than in 1956 or 
1979. 
IV. Discussion 
This paper advocates for the joint advancement of two 
tasks: on the one hand, specifying roles of the State that 
could become meaningful criteria in typologies of capital-
ism; on the other hand, testing the relevance of empirical 
indicators that could be systematically computed not only 
for various countries, but also for various periods, in order 
to capture such roles. We have shown that it would be 
possible, and useful, to more systematically assess not only 
the number or size of SOEs, but also their position in na-
tional interlocking directorates networks, so as to to better 
understand what role they allow the State to play rather 
than automatically equating the existence of SOEs with a 
specific type of State capitalism. In the French case, contra-
ry to what is often assumed, the number and chronology 
of SOEs do not appear to be very unusual, even when 
compared to the UK, the alleged epitome of a liberal mar-
ket economy. We do not know, at this stage, how the 
positioning of SOEs in interlocking directorate networks 
have differed during the history of these two countries. 
However, by comparing France with Italy and a few other 
countries, we have already shown that different roles as-
signed to SOEs by governments led to different positions in 
such networks. In addition, we have brought to light an 
extremely consistent feature of the French interlocking 
directorates network, that does not fit in the dichotomy 
assumed by the VOC approach between competing firms 
(isolated) and co-operating firms (sharing board members). 
While quite dense, the French network is also extremely 
hierarchical, following a stable status mechanism. SOEs 
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and the governments that decided on their goals have for 
the most part adapted to this mechanism, as well as to the 
secondary group-building mechanism creating denser 
clusters in the network. We do not claim here that this in 
itself represents some sort of third-type capitalism. Howev-
er, we are already able to contend that the status mecha-
nism does not easily fit in VOC typologies; nor can this 
feature be captured by the classical nation of a “State 
capitalism” where the State would mostly direct, organize 
or lead, rarely mediate or facilitate, and never be a mere 
bystander. 
How can we better make sense of the French status and 
group-building mechanisms, and investigate other ways to 
put the State back into typologies of capitalism? At least 
two main investigations should be led from here, in order 
to enlighten how state resources, actors and practices are 
involved in the two mechanisms we have identified. Firstly, 
an important feature of the French interlocking direc-
torates network that partially underlies the status mecha-
nism is related to the State, but it is probably not as much 
of an exception as has often been argued: this is the im-
portance of former civil servants on corporate boards, 
called pantouflage in French (see e.g. Suleiman, 1979, 
Charle, 1987, Bourdieu, 1989, Maclean et al., 2006). Pre-
liminary analyses of our biographical datasets indicate that 
they are disproportionately present among shared board 
members between high-status firms, and possibly among 
shared board members between high- and middle-status 
firms. Their multiple appointments are therefore important 
for the status mechanism. Moreover, it is not a past phe-
nomenon or one related to the golden years of SOEs: like 
the status mechanism itself, it began in the 19th century 
and was reinforced from the 1979 to the 2009 samples 
(François, 2010). Does this imply that the status mecha-
nism is in fact a mere expression of the pervasive presence 
of the State and of State-led policies? Hall and Soskice 
(2001b, p. 35), citing Lehrer (2001, in the same volume), 
suggest that French managers, often coming from elite 
schools and the public service, were “more likely to look to 
the state for assistance than their counterparts in other 
nations”. This is however an important interpretive step 
that deserves empirical examination, as former civil serv-
ants do not necessarily bring specific, statist policies with 
them. On the contrary, as continuing a career in the pri-
vate sector is a reasonable step for people holding certain 
offices in the administration, they could very well act ac-
cording to this perspective from the very beginning of their 
career; Jabko and Massoc (2012) have thus argued that 
the proximity between the financial sector and the admin-
istration hindered reforms after the 2008 financial crisis, 
just as Johnson and Kwak (2010) did for the US case. We 
need more systematic and careful comparisons with other 
famous cases of careers spanning the public-private divide 
in different countries (e.g. Useem, 1984, Colignon and 
Usui, 2003) before coming back to simple characterizations 
of an exceptional French statism. 
Likewise, the study of what we called a group-building 
mechanism, which is obviously related to competition 
policies, would benefit from a more systematic study of 
such policies. In this realm, the US anti-trust laws have too 
often been considered as the sole benchmark; in recent 
years, a growing interest in cartels has added an alternative 
(e.g. Schröter, 1996). However, there are other dimensions 
to the space of possible competition policies than that 
opposing cartels to anti-trust laws. While recent studies of 
US anti-trust laws have emphasized that they were chosen 
following political debates, at specific moments, from a 
wide range of alternatives (see especially O’Sullivan, 2000), 
research on the UK and on France (Cheffins, 2004 Chatri-
ot, 2010, Stanziani, 2012) has discussed the effect of legis-
lation that did not as strictly forbid cartels as in the US, 
while they did not promote them or make them official as 
had long been the case in Germany or Switzerland. How-
ever, we lack a systematic study on how such regulations 
impacted cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates 
networks. However, it is already interesting to consider 
that, in terms of cartels, the French State was much less 
interventionist than many others, and some of its SOEs 
inherited the structures of former groups that were private 
quasi-cartels. 
Exploring further in these two directions (the role of former 
civil servants on boards of large private firms and policies 
of competition) is certainly a necessary step if one is to 
properly understand the mechanisms that have shaped the 
French network over the last century. This exploration is 
also a way to see more clearly how SOEs in France con-
formed to pre-existing structures. It is only when these 
tasks would have been completed, and replicated for other 
countries, that the place of France in the typologies of 
capitalism can be properly assessed, along with the im-
portance of the State in such typologies. 
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Endnotes 
1A full description will be put online soon at  
http://www.cgeh.nl/power-corporate-networks-comparative-and-
historical-perspective , eventually followed by the dataset itself. 
This project was initially funded by CapGemini sponsorship re-
ceived by our research center, then by a research grant of Scien-
tific Advisory Board of Sciences Po, Paris (additional Swiss and 
German funding was received by Thomas David and Paul Windolf, 
who agreed to share data with us). Nicolas Alexandropoulos, 
Gaëtane d'Arbonneau, Sylvain Brunier, Celia Darakdjian, Thomas 
David, Cyril Grange, Florence Largillière, Lena Le Goff, Thomas 
Maineult, Frédéric Rebmann and Victoria Scoffier have contribut-
ed to the data gathering. 
2The adjustment of SOEs to pre-existing mechanisms seems also 
to be found in other countries, while the mechanisms themselves 
differ. In 1976 Finland, SOEs were neither central nor clustered 
together, but were part of several of the separate groups based 
on sector or ideology that made up the national network 
(Heiskanen and Johanson 1985). In Taiwan, the very dense inter-
locking that had begun with Japanese zaibatsu was mimicked by 
SOEs after 1945 and still partly endures after privatizations (Lee 
and Venema 2014). 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the post-war varieties of capitalism (1950s-1970s) 
 Market capitalism Managed capitalism State capitalism 
  (Britain) (Germany) (France) 
Government role    
Policies toward Liberal Enabling Interventionist 
Business Arbitrator Facilitator Director 
Policies toward Bystander Bystander Organiser 
Labour    
Business relations    
Inter-firm relations Competitive Co-operative State led 
 Contractual Mutually reinforcing State mediated 
 Individualistic Network based  
Investment sources Capital markets Banks State 
Time horizons Short-term view Long-term view Medium-term view 
Goals Profits Firm value National political- 
   economic priorities 
Industrial relations    
Management-labour Adversarial Co-operative Adversarial 
Relations    
Wage bargaining Fragmented Co-ordinated State controlled 
Schmidt, 2003    
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Graph 1: Interlocking directorates among the 252 largest French listed firms in 1990 
 
The dataset underlying this graph is presented in the above paragraph about “Research design”. Grey lines represent shared directors; 
the width of the line represents the number of shared directors. Circles represent firms, with white circles for SOEs and black circles for 
private firms. The size of circles represents the status of firms, as defined below in the main text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
